We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. During the crisis, cumulative stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10 to 20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining the incentives of insiders to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Conflict of interest between corporate insiders (controlling shareholders and managers) and outside investors is central to the analysis of the modern corporation in which insiders have less than full ownership of the cash flow rights of the firm (Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). These analyses suggest that the firm's ownership structure is a primary determinant of the extent of agency problems between controlling insiders and outside investors, which has important implications for the valuation of the firm.
The insiders who control corporate assets can potentially expropriate outside investors by diverting resources for their personal use or by committing funds to unprofitable projects that provide private benefits. By diverting resources for private benefit, controlling managers have the opportunity to increase their current wealth or perquisite consumption without bearing the full cost of their actions. 1 Alternatively, by investing resources within the firm in positive NPV projects, managers have the opportunity to increase their future wealth in proportion to their claims on the firm's future cash flows. In general, the incentives of controlling insiders to divert resources away from profitable investment projects are decreasing in the level of the insider's proportional cash flow ownership and in the rate of return available on investment projects.
While there is substantial empirical evidence regarding the relation between ownership structure and firm value (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , McConnell and Servaes (1990) , and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) ), it has nevertheless been difficult to conduct irrefutable tests of this hypothesis. A primary problem has been disentangling the endogeneity issues that arise because ownership structure, investment opportunities, and firm value may all be jointly determined (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Kole (1996) , Cho (1998) , Himmelberg, Hubbard and 1 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discuss several ways by which insiders can divert funds including outright theft, dilution of outside investors through share issues to insiders, excessive salaries, asset sales to themselves or other corporations they Palia (1999) , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , and Core and Larcker (2002) ). Another issue is that many of the tests of the relationship between ownership structure and firm value have been conducted on samples of U.S. firms, which, in a global context, might not face expected agency problems that are all that severe (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Stein (2002) ).
In this paper, we examine whether differences in ownership structure at the firm level can explain differences in firm performance during the East Asian financial crisis that began in July 1997.
The East Asian crisis offers an interesting opportunity to study the valuation effects of ownership structure that avoids some of the potential shortcomings of prior research. First, the crisis represented a relatively exogenous shock (at least with respect to any individual firm) that significantly lowered the available return on investment opportunities of firms in the affected countries. Holding ownership structure constant, this shock to returns lowered the marginal cost to insiders of diverting resources away from profitable investment projects and increased the expected level of expropriation (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (hereafter JBBF) (2000)).
Second, relative to the U.S. and many other well-developed economies, La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (1999) , Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Lins (2003) show that the widespread use of pyramidal ownership structures and cross-holdings in East Asia allows insiders to exercise effective control over a company, despite owning relatively few of its cash flow rights.
Moreover, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (hereafter LLSV) (1998) argue that the absence of strong legal protections and other external governance mechanisms (such as takeovers) in many emerging economies further increase the severity of agency problems between controlling insiders and outside investors.
control at favorable prices, or transfer pricing with other entities they control. See also Johnson, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) for evidence on expropriation in emerging markets.
Our main hypothesis is that, during the crisis, values should decline the most in firms where managers employ ownership structures that allow them to effectively control the firm while reducing the cash flow rights associated with their control rights. There is anecdotal evidence that supports this view.
For example, after the onset of the crisis, United Engineers Malaysia, a healthy firm with strong growth prospects, bought out some management-controlled shares of its financially troubled parent, Renong Corporation, at artificially high prices. Both firms are controlled by the same family through a pyramid structure. The buyout directly transferred wealth to the family at the expense of minority shareholders of both firms (Moore (1998)). Similarly, Backman (1999) reports that the Chairman of the Ekram Group, Ting Pek Khiing, issued shares in Ekram in May 1997 with the declared intention of purchasing shares in the holding company of Bakun Hydro-Electric Corporation, the operator of the largest hydroelectric project ever undertaken in Malaysia. Instead, as the crisis took hold, the money from the share issuance was ultimately used, via third parties, to buy out Ting's stakes in several of the Ekram Group's publicly-traded affiliates. Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) report that minority shareholders of Samsung Group affiliates have been expropriated extensively in the late 1990s through below-market share issues to insiders. In one case, the son of the Samsung Group chairman and three other family members were issued large amounts of shares in a publicly-traded group holding, Samsung SDS, at less than 15% of their current market value.
Further examples of minority shareholder expropriation in East Asia during the crisis period are provided in Table 1 of JBBF (2000) .
Using detailed ownership data from 800 firms in eight East Asian countries, we test our hypothesis by examining variation across firms in stock returns during the crisis period as a function of the firm's ownership structure. Our ownership data indicate that, in many East Asian firms, managers are able to effectively control the firm even though they may have relatively low cash flow ownership. In our sample, we find that the mean ratio of the management group's control rights to its cash flow rights, a measure we call "cash flow rights leverage", is greater than 2.0. We also observe that management group control rights average 26%, and that the management group has the largest blockholding of control rights in two thirds of our sample firms. In addition, we find substantial variation across firms and countries in the separation between ownership and control. Consistent with our hypothesis, our estimates indicate that cumulative stock returns during the crisis period of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10 to 20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. In contrast, we find no effect of control and cash flow rights separation on firm performance during the crisis for firms in which managers have low levels of control rights. This latter finding suggests that the ability to control the firm's assets is a necessary antecedent for expropriation of minority shareholders. Our results are robust to controls for differences in risk across firms, as well as industry and country effects, such as the strength of a country's legal institutions.
Prior to the crisis, we expect that the effects of cash flow rights leverage on changes in shareholder value should be less evident. When times are good, the expected amount of expropriation will be relatively small and will be already capitalized into current prices. In our experiment, it is precisely the unexpected shock to investment opportunities resulting from the crisis that allows us to more clearly identify the effects of ownership structure on value. Consistent with this view, we find no differences in cumulative stock returns between firms with and without cash flow rights leverage prior to the crisis, even when managerial control is relatively high. These findings help to ensure that our results during the crisis are not spurious, and provide additional support for our prediction that management's "leverage" of cash flow ownership into greater effective control of the firm enhances the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders during a period of declining investment opportunities.
Our work is related to several strands of the growing literature on international corporate governance (see Denis and McConnell (2002) for a comprehensive survey). JBBF (2000) find that countries with stronger legal protections for minority shareholders experienced less severe exchange rate depreciation and stock market declines during the crisis than did countries with weaker legal protections. They also show that measures of legal protection provide at least as convincing an explanation of the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline as do the usual macroeconomic arguments. JBBF focus primarily on differences in the legal systems and the strength of legal enforcement across different countries, although their intuition and model are motivated at the firm level.
We focus on differences in ownership structure at the firm level, while controlling for the legal regime of the country and other factors. In a similar vein, Mitton (2002) studies approximately 400 firms in five East Asian countries and finds evidence that firms with greater disclosure performed better than other firms during the crisis period. In contrast to our findings, however, he finds only weak evidence that the separation of cash flow and control rights affects firm performance during the crisis period. We discuss in detail how our results relate to those of Mitton in Section II.C. Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper (2002) find that East Asian companies controlled by management/family groups were less likely to file for bankruptcy during the crisis. They argue that this insurance against bankruptcy may come at the expense of minority shareholders. Finally, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that, despite inadequate protection ex ante, the use of arm's length capital (i.e., a market-based and contractual framework) in East Asia worked fine before the crisis, but could not provide safeguards against expropriation during the crisis, leading to minority investors rationally exiting the market.
Our results are also complementary to those of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) and Lins (2003) , which both show that the level of firm value is negatively associated with a separation of cash flow ownership and control. Further, our results complement the LLSV (2002) and Claessens et al. (2002) results that firm values are higher when the cash flow rights held by the controlling blockholder are higher. Importantly, in the spirit of Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), we focus on the effect of ownership structure on changes in firm value precipitated by a shock to the firm's investment opportunities. As such, our analysis potentially avoids some of the issues regarding the endogeneity of ownership structure and firm performance that may arise in a static analysis.
Finally, our work is related to several papers that focus on the valuation effects of a firm's political connections in East Asia. Fisman (2002) studies the pre-crisis period and finds that wellconnected Indonesian firms lost significant value when President Suharto's health took a turn for the worse. Closer to our paper, Johnson and Mitton (2002) find that Malaysian firms that are more associated with the incumbent politicians lost more value during the crisis. If well-connected firms across East Asia are also the ones that have high cash flow rights leverage (a distinct possibility, but one we cannot measure), then this factor could at least partially explain our results.
Our paper thus adds to the existing literature on ownership structure by examining changes in shareholder value, rather than levels (which mitigates endogeneity concerns) in emerging markets (where differences in corporate governance should matter most) during the crisis period (when differences in corporate governance should matter most). In doing so, we are able construct powerful tests of the relation between ownership structure and firm performance.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the sample and Section II presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section III concludes with a brief summary.
I.
Sample Selection and Summary Statistics of a firm's blockholdings be observable in order for the firm to remain in the sample. We lose 457
firms because of a lack of ownership data.
5 Figure 1 provides an example of the computation of control rights, cash flow rights, and cash flow rights leverage for three Malaysian sample firms that are controlled in a pyramid chain by Halim Bin Saad. Cash flow rights leverage will be equal to unity when control rights equal cash flow rights, which corresponds to the management group obtaining its control solely through direct ownership of the firm's shares. This is the case for the top firm in the pyramid, Renong Berhad, in which Halim Bin Saad directly owns 28.3% of the shares and is the sole blockholder. The next firm in the pyramid is United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), which is 32.5% owned by Renong and is controlled by Halim Bin Saad. Management group control rights are equal to 32.5%, management group cash flow rights are equal to 9.2% (28.3% x 32.5%), and cash flow rights leverage is equal to 3.5 (32.5% / 9.2%).
UEM then owns 62.4% of Kintas Kellas PLC (also controlled by Halim Bin Saad), which gives Kintas Kellas a cash flow rights leverage value of 10.9 (62.4% / 5.7%). To avoid overemphasizing firms with extreme pyramid structures, we winsorize cash flow rights leverage values at the 95th percentile by setting values above the 95 th percentile equal to the 95 th percentile (a value of about 10).
In our main empirical analysis, we measure the separation of cash flow and control rights using a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm has cash flow rights leverage above unity, and zero otherwise. We select this specification because it is not clear that increases in the separation of management's control and cash flow rights will necessarily have a linear effect on firm value. For robustness, we also discuss results using both the raw level and the natural log of cash flow rights leverage in Section II.B.
Our primary valuation measure is a firm's cumulative stock return (buy and hold return) over the crisis period. There is general agreement that the crisis period began in July 1997, but there is no clear consensus on exactly when the crisis ended (see JBBF (2000)). Returns from the MSCI country indices indicate that East Asian markets were improving substantially by August 1998. Therefore, we define the crisis period as July 1, 1997 to August 1, 1998. Our crisis period definition corresponds to the one used by Johnson and Mitton (2002) .
We collect monthly stock return data in local currency from Datastream. We focus on changes in shareholder value measured in local currency because we are interested in the effects of differences in ownership on firm performance across firms within countries. By measuring performance in local currency, we net out any effects of exchange rates that are common to all firms within each country. Stock returns are not available for 60 of our sample firms at the onset of the crisis. To mitigate survivorship bias, we retain in the sample 17 firms that have stock returns available at the beginning of the crisis, but that were delisted during the crisis.
To control for other factors that might affect stock returns, we use a regression framework with several control variables that are plausibly related to differences in risk across firms. Firm size, measured as the market value of equity in U.S. dollars using the prevailing exchange rate, leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and the book-to-market ratio, measured as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, are obtained from Worldscope. Our measures of size, leverage, and book-to-market are computed at the end of the firm's 1996 fiscal year in order to avoid any spurious correlation between these variables and our measures of changes in firm value during the crisis. Our final risk control, beta, is computed by regressing a firm's monthly stock return in the pre-crisis period on the corresponding country index return from Datastream using the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. We require at least 12 months of return data prior to July 1997 to compute beta and use a maximum of 36 month's worth of data. After removing firms with missing data for any of the control variables, our final sample contains 800 firms.
Finally, we estimate our regressions using indicator variables for a firm's primary two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code to control for industry, and include a country's rule of law score from LLSV (1998) in our regressions to control for the external legal environment. The rule of law score ranges from zero to ten with lower scores corresponding to less tradition for law and order. In the robustness section, we also estimate our models using country fixed effects and find similar results.
Summary statistics for the overall sample are shown in the last column of Table II. As expected, the table shows that firms performed poorly during the crisis, with cumulative stock market returns approaching negative 50 percent, on average. The average market value of equity in the sample is 675 million USD and the average ratio of total liabilities to assets is 0.54. Mean values of betas and book to market ratios are both below unity and the average rule of law score is 6.97.
Ownership statistics for these eight East Asian countries closely track those reported in Lins (2003) for a larger emerging markets sample. The control rights held by a firm's officers and directors and their families, which we refer to as the management group, average 26 percent across the sample. As mentioned, these control rights include direct ownership as well as the effect of those stakes obtained indirectly via management group ownership and control of blockholders in the firm (i.e., pyramid ownership). Cash flow rights leverage averages 2.17 for our sample firms, which
indicates that the typical management group is able to turn one cash flow ownership right into over two control rights. Such a separation of ownership and control significantly increases the potential for managerial agency problems. 
II. Empirical Analysis

A. Univariate statistics on ownership structure and firm value during the crisis
Our primary hypothesis is that, all else equal, firms in which insiders have high levels of control rights, but own few of the firm's cash flow rights will exhibit the largest declines in firm value during the crisis. To provide some preliminary evidence on this hypothesis, Table III presents univariate comparisons of cumulative stock returns during the crisis for firms with high and low cash flow rights leverage for the overall sample and for subsamples based on the level of the control rights held by the management/family group.
We first divide firms into two groups based on whether they have cash flow rights leverage that is greater than unity. Panel A of the table compares summary statistics across these two groups of firms. The mean cumulative stock return during the crisis period for firms in the high cash flow rights leverage group is -56.2 percent compared to -46.5 percent for firms in the low cash flow rights leverage group. The difference of -9.7 percent is statistically significant (p-value = 0.00).
The suggests that differences in risk arising from differences in leverage are unlikely to explain our results. Overall, the univariate evidence is consistent with our primary hypothesis since we find that firms with high cash flow rights leverage exhibit significantly worse performance during the crisis period relative to firms with low cash flow rights leverage.
The crux of our primary hypothesis, however, states that a separation of managerial ownership and control should be especially problematic for minority shareholders in cases where managers exert effective control over a firm's assets. Therefore, Panel B in Table III further separates firms based on the overall level of control rights held by the management group. Using an independent sort, we group firms into two subsamples based on whether the level of management group control rights is above or below the median in that country. By sorting firms within each country, we are able to partially control for cross-country differences in ownership structure. As an alternative measure of the degree of effective control, we also sort firms into two groups based on whether the management group is the largest blockholder in the firm. We prefer the first measure, however, because in many cases the management group is the largest blockholder despite having relatively few control rights.
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Panel B of the table presents results for subsamples based on our measures of the overall level of control rights held by the management group. Consistent with our hypothesis, the first two rows of the table show that the negative effect on valuation of the separation of control rights from cash flow rights is present only in those firms with above-median management control rights ownership.
Within the high management control rights subsample, firms for which the management group employs cash flow rights leverage to obtain its control have average cumulative stock returns that are 17.9 percentage points lower (p-value = 0.00) than those in firms with high management control in which managers hold only direct equity stakes. In contrast, the second row in Panel B of Table III shows that cash flow rights leverage differences do not affect crisis period stock returns when the management group has relatively low control rights. It is interesting to note that there are only 43 firms in which the management group has below-median control rights and uses cash flow rights leverage to obtain these control rights.
The last two rows of Table III assess whether cash flow rights leverage affects value more negatively when managers are the largest blockholder. We expect that managers should be able to exercise greater discretion in their activities when they hold a plurality of a firm's control rights.
Thus, this ownership measure is complementary to the previous measure of above-median managerial control rights used to gauge effective managerial control. Given the high levels of managerial control rights for our sample firms overall, it is not surprising that the management group is the largest blockholder of control rights 67 percent of the time.
7 Specifically, in the subsample where managers are the largest blockholder, the 10 th percentile of control rights ownership is 12 percent. It is not clear in these cases that managers can exert effective control over the firm's assets.
Within the subsample of firms in which the management group is the largest blockholder, firms in which the management group also employs cash flow rights leverage to obtain its control have average cumulative stock returns that are 12.2 percentage points lower (p-value = 0.00) compared to those in firms which have no cash flow rights leverage. The last row of Panel C shows that the use of cash flow rights leverage does not affect stock returns during the crisis when there is a larger outside blockholder present in a firm's ownership structure; a situation in which management may not be in effective control of the firm. Only 10 sample firms, however, have ownership structures featuring cash flow rights leverage when the management group is not the largest control rights blockholder.
B. Multivariate analysis of ownership structure and firm value during the crisis
The univariate tests provide preliminary evidence consistent with our main hypothesis.
However, to control for variables other than ownership structure that differ across firms and countries and that may affect stock returns, we use a regression framework. The dependent variable for all of the regressions is the cumulative stock return during the crisis period.
8 As control variables we include the log of firm size, leverage, the log of the book-to-market ratio, the stock's beta, and the country's rule of law score in the regressions. We also control for industry effects using indicator variables for two-digit SIC codes. All significance levels are computed using robust standard errors.
To measure the effects of ownership structure on valuations during the crisis, we use an indicator variable equal to one for firms with cash flow rights leverage greater than unity and indicator variables equal to one when managers have above median control rights (or are the largest blockholder). To test whether ownership structures in which managers have a high level of control rights, but relatively few cash flow rights, have an incremental effect on stock returns during the crisis we interact the indicator variable for cash flow rights leverage greater than unity with our indicator variables measuring the degree of managerial control.
The results of our regressions are shown in Table IV . In model (1), we include only the indicator for cash flow rights leverage greater than unity as a measure of ownership structure. The coefficient estimate on the cash flow rights leverage indicator variable is -0.116 (p-value = 0.00).
The coefficient estimate indicates that the stock returns of firms with cash flow rights leverage greater than unity declined by almost 12 percentage points more during the crisis compared to firms with no cash flow rights leverage. We also find that the rule of law variable is positive and significant (p-value = 0.00), indicating that firms in countries with stronger legal protections fared better than firms in countries with weak legal protection of minority shareholders. This finding is consistent with the results of JBBF (2000), who find that overall stock market returns during the crisis are positively correlated with measures of the strength of countries' legal institutions. It is also consistent with the findings presented in LLSV (2002) that firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q) is positively related to a country's legal protection. With respect to the control variables, the coefficients on firm size and beta are negative, but not significant. 9 The coefficient on leverage is also negative and statistically significant (p-value = 0.00), and the coefficient on the book-to-market ratio is positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.05).
In models (2) through (5), we report regression results for subsamples based on our two measures of the overall level of control rights held by the management group. Models (2) and (3) market model technique we employ to estimate beta. We re-estimate the models of Tables IV and V using these valuation measures as dependent variables and find results similar to those reported.
report results for firms that have above-and below-median management group control rights, respectively. Models (4) and (5) report the results of regressions for subsamples based on whether or not the management group is the largest blockholder. The results in these subsamples are in line with our primary hypothesis. Models (2) and (3) show that the effect of cash flow rights leverage on changes in shareholder value is significantly negative only in the subsample of firms where managers hold substantial control rights. Similarly, models (4) and (5) show that cash flow rights leverage is negatively related to value only when management is the largest blockholder.
Models (6) and (7) allow for more formal statistical tests of our hypothesis by including in our regressions indicator variables for cash flow rights leverage greater than unity and the level of managerial control (above-median control rights or management being the largest blockholder). We also include an interaction term between the cash flow rights leverage indicator variable and the indicator variable for the degree of managerial control in order to parse out the effects of ownership structures in which managers exert effective control over the firm's assets while holding relatively few of the cash flow rights.
The results are consistent with our hypothesis. In model (6), the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is -0.192 (p-value = 0.00), indicating that ownership structures in which managers have above-median control rights and also employ cash flow rights leverage have a significantly negative effect on stock returns during the crisis. In contrast, the coefficient estimate on the standalone indicator for cash flow rights leverage is not statistically significant, indicating that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights does not affect firm performance when managers hold only a low level of control rights. This latter result suggests that having a significant degree of control over the firm's assets is a necessary condition for expropriation of minority shareholders. 9 We estimate regressions without industry controls and find the coefficient on beta to be negative (as expected during the Model (7) yields similar results for the case when managers are the firm's largest blockholder. The coefficient on the interaction term in model (7) is -0.225 (p-value = 0.07), and the coefficient on the stand-alone indicator for cash flow rights leverage greater than unity is not statistically significant.
Models (6) and (7) also provide evidence consistent with an incentive alignment hypothesis.
In model (6), the coefficient on the stand-alone indicator variable for firms with above-median control rights is 0.103 (p-value = 0.03), indicating that firms in which managers have a high level of control rights, and an equivalent level of cash flow rights, have stock returns during the crisis that are 10.3 percentage points higher than firms in which managers have below-median control rights.
Similar findings obtain for the "management is the largest blockholder dummy" in model (7).
For robustness, we assess whether our choice to dichotomize the continuous cash flow rights leverage variable into values above one or equal to one affects our results. As mentioned previously, we use the binary specification because it is not clear that increasing the separation of management's control and cash flow rights will necessarily have a linear effect on firm value. We re-estimate all of our regression models using the natural log of cash flow rights leverage as the ownership variable of interest, and find that the log of cash flow rights leverage is negatively and significantly related to a firm's cumulative stock return during the crisis (p-value = 0.03). Subsample tests also show that the log of cash flow rights leverage negatively affects only those firms in which the management group has above-median control rights (p-value = 0.00) or is the largest control rights blockholder (p-value = 0.04). These robustness tests indicate that there is a significant negative relation between cash flow crisis) and statistically significant, which suggests that industry effects subsume the cross-sectional variation in beta.
rights leverage and firm value in the crisis period. For the sake of brevity, these results are not reported in a table.
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In summary, consistent with our hypothesis, the results indicate that stock returns during the crisis are lower when managers employ ownership structures that provide them with a high degree of control of the firm while reducing the cash flow rights associated with their control rights. In addition, we find that stock returns are higher when the management group directly owns a large fraction of the firm's cash flow rights. These findings are complementary to those of Claessens et al. 
C. Additional tests
Mitton (2002) also examines how various aspects of corporate governance affect firm performance during the crisis using a smaller sample of approximately 400 firms from five East Asian countries. In this section, we discuss some additional (untabulated) robustness tests and compare and contrast some of our results with those of Mitton.
Using the ownership data compiled by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Mitton also finds evidence that stock returns during the crisis period are positively related to the cash flow rights of the firm's largest blockholder. He finds only weak evidence, however, that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights has an effect on firm performance during the crisis. We believe that there are two primary reasons for the differences in our results. First, the measure of the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights used by Claessens et al. is computed solely for the largest blockholder of a firm. For approximately one-third of the Claessens et al. sample, an entity other than family/management is the controlling blockholder (e.g. the government or another widely held corporation). Thus, their data on the divergence between cash flow and control rights blend together the effects of control rights held by family/management and control rights held by other blockholders.
In contrast, our measure of the difference between control rights and cash flow rights is computed for the management group only and is computed for each firm in the sample, even if there is a larger outside blockholder. Second, our hypothesis suggests that the focus should be on firms where managers have a high degree of control but own relatively few of the firm's cash flow rights. Mitton does not separate his sample along these lines.
We first examine whether our results obtain within the five East Asian countries studied by
Mitton. For this analysis, we remove firms from Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan from the sample and re-estimate our models. It is interesting to note that the remaining five countries have the lowest rule of law scores in the sample. The regression coefficients on the ownership structure variables are similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those from the full sample. Another difference is that Mitton controls for cross-country differences using country fixed-effects, whereas we use a country's rule of law score. We estimate models using country fixed-effects and find results similar to those in Table IV . The estimate on the interaction coefficient corresponding to firms in which managers hold above-median levels of control rights and have employed cash flow rights leverage greater than unity is -0.162 (p-value = 0.03). For firms in which managers hold below-median levels of control rights, cash flow rights leverage does not significantly affect stock returns during the crisis.
For the case in which the management group is the largest blockholder of control rights, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.187, but is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.14).
Finally, because Mitton argues that better disclosure may be associated with higher effective firm governance, we obtain information on the types of cross-listed securities, if any, that our sample firms have in their capital structure at the onset of the crisis. We construct indicator variables for firms with securities that require a reconciliation of accounts to U.S. GAAP and adherance to SEC disclosure mandates (Level II and III ADRs and Yankee bonds) and for firms whose cross-listed securities do not require any additional financial reporting or disclosure (Level I (OTC-traded) and Rule 144A ADRs). We find that there are relatively few U.S. cross-listed securities of all types (76 cases) among our 800 sample firms and that only six of them are the type requiring U.S. GAAP and increased disclosure. We re-estimate our models from Table IV including these indicator variables for different types of cross-listed securities and find that they are insignificant in all cases. The coefficients on our ownership structure variables remain significant and are virtually unchanged by the inclusion of the cross-listing indicators.
D. The effects of ownership structure on firm value prior to the crisis
As noted earlier in this paper, in our experiment, it is the unexpected shock to investment opportunities resulting from the crisis that allows us to more clearly isolate the effects of ownership structure on firm value. When times are good, the expected amount of expropriation will be relatively small and will be already capitalized into current prices. This implies that the effects of cash flow rights leverage on changes in shareholder value (e.g., stock returns) should be less evident prior to the crisis. We investigate this hypothesis in Table V . The table reports regressions that correspond to models (1), (6), and (7) of Table IV , but the dependent variable is now the cumulative stock return over a one-year period preceding the crisis. Specifically, we measure buy and hold returns over the period January 1, 1996 to January 1, 1997. We first test the overall effect of cash flow rights leverage in model (1) and find no evidence that cash flow rights leverage greater than unity has an effect on changes in value during the pre-crisis period. When we interact the cash flow rights leverage dummy with each of our dummy variables for managerial control in models (2) and (3), we find no significant coefficient on either interaction, indicating that the combination of high managerial control and cash flow rights leverage does not affect changes in value. These pre-crisis results provide further evidence that minority shareholder expropriation is related to a firm's marginal investment opportunities. 11 They also provide additional confidence that the results we document during the crisis period are not spurious.
III. Conclusions
We study the effect of ownership structure on changes in shareholder value during the East Asian financial crisis that began in July 1997. The crisis represented a negative shock to the investment opportunities of firms in these markets that raised the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Moreover, the large separation between cash flow ownership and control rights that arises from the use of pyramidal ownership structures in these markets suggests that insiders have both the incentive and the ability to engage in expropriation.
Using data from 800 firms in eight East Asian countries, we find evidence consistent with this view. Cumulative stock returns of firms in which managers and their families separate their control and cash flow rights through pyramid ownership structures are lower by 12 percentage points during the crisis period compared to those of other firms. Further, we find that the stock return 11 Similar results obtain when we use the log of cash flow rights leverage (rather than the dummy variable) or when we underperformance associated with pyramid ownership structures is present only in firms where the management group also has a high level of control. The underperformance increases to about 20 percentage points for these firms. Finally, during the pre-crisis period, we find no evidence that firms with a separation between managerial cash flow rights and control rights exhibit changes in performance different from firms with no such separation.
Although indirect, the evidence is consistent with the view that corporate ownership structure plays an important role in determining the incentives of insiders to expropriate minority shareholders during times of declining investment opportunities. Our results add to the literature that examines the link between ownership structure and firm performance and provide additional guidance to policymakers engaged in the ongoing debate about the proper role and design of corporate governance features and legal institutions in developing economies.
use cumulative abnormal returns in the pre-crisis period as the dependent variable.
Table I Sample Selection Procedure
The Worldscope database is the source of all financial data for our sample. We eliminate financial firms and firms not listed on a country's primary stock exchange. Financial firms are those with primary SIC codes in the 6000-6999 range. The primary stock exchanges for the eight countries in our sample (listed in alphabetical order in the table) are Hong Kong, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore, Seoul, Taipei, and Bangkok, respectively. We obtain all stock return data from Datastream. Cumulative stock returns represent the total return over the crisis period, which we define as the period from July 1, 1997 to August 1, 1998. Management ownership refers to all stakes held by a firm's officers and directors and their families. All ownership data are obtained from Lins (2003) Mean values of summary statistics by country are listed along with median values in parentheses. Cumulative stock returns represent the total return over the crisis period, which we define as the period from July 1, 1997 to August 1, 1998. Management ownership refers to all stakes held by a firm's officers and directors and their families. Management control rights and cash flow ownership rights of a firm include direct ownership as well as the effect of those stakes obtained indirectly via management ownership and control of blockholders in the firm (i.e. pyramid ownership). "Cash flow rights leverage" is computed as management control rights divided by the cash flow rights associated with those control rights. All ownership data are obtained from Lins (2003) for the fiscal year closest to December 1995. Market value of equity, the total liability to total assets ratio, and the book to market ratio are measured using the fiscal year-end that precedes July 1, 1997. The market value of equity of a firm is reported in millions of U.S. dollars. "Book to market ratio" refers to the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Scholes-Williams (1977) Betas are computed using stock returns and the corresponding MSCI country index returns for a minimum data range of 12 months (maximum of 36 months) prior to July 1, 1997. The "Rule of Law" variable is obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) . This measure ranges from 0 to 10 with lower scores corresponding to less tradition for law and order. The table reports mean values for summary statistics. The "Cash flow rights leverage dummy" is set equal to one if cash flow rights leverage is greater than one, and zero if cash flow rights leverage equals one. "High management group control dummy" is set equal to one if the firm has above-median management group control rights ownership, computed within each country, and zero otherwise. "Management group is the largest blockholder (BH) dummy" is set equal to one if the control rights held by the management group exceed those of any other blockholder type, and zero otherwise. All other variables are described previously in Table II . The p-values of the t-test of equality are reported in parentheses. Panel A reports summary statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports summary statistics for subsamples based on the high management group control dummy and the management group is the largest blockholder dummy. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative stock return during the crisis period. Cumulative stock return and most of the independent variables are described in Tables II and III . Variables new to this table are as follows. High mgmt control * CF leverage dummy is an interaction between the high management group control dummy and the cash flow rights leverage dummy. Mgmt is largest BH * CF leverage dummy is an interaction between the management group is the largest blockholder dummy and the cash flow rights leverage dummy. Models (1), (6), and (7) are estimated on the full sample. Models (2) and (3) are estimated for subsamples based on the high management group control dummy. Models (4) and (5) are estimated for subsamples based on the management group is the largest blockholder dummy. Regressions include (unreported) two-digit primary SIC code fixed effects and are estimated using White's correction for heteroskedasticity. P-values are in parentheses below each coefficient. The dependent variable for all regressions is the cumulative stock return during the period before the crisis, which we define as January 1, 1996 to January 1, 1997. All models are estimated on the full sample of firms with sufficient data to compute control variables in the pre-crisis period. Ownership variables and the Rule of Law variable are described in Tables II and IV . Market value of equity, the debt to total assets ratio, and the book to market ratio are measured from the closest fiscal year preceding January 1, 1996 and are described further in Table II . Scholes-Williams Betas are computed using stock returns and the corresponding MSCI country index returns for a minimum data range of 12 months (maximum of 36 months) prior to January 1, 1996. Regressions are estimated with two-digit primary SIC code fixed effects (coefficients not reported). All regressions are estimated using White's correction for heteroskedasticity. P-values are in parentheses below each coefficient.
Independent Variables
(1) (2) 
